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Simplified Courts Can’t Solve Inequality
Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter
Abstract: State civil courts struggle to handle the volume of cases before them. Litigants in these courts,
most of whom are unrepresented, struggle to navigate the courts to solve their problems. This accessto-justice crisis has led to a range of reform efforts and solutions. One type of reform, court simplification, strives to reduce the complexity of procedures and information used by courts to help unrepresented
litigants navigate the judicial system. These reforms mitigate but do not solve the symptoms of the larger underlying problem: state civil courts are struggling because they have been stuck with legal cases that
arise from the legislative and executive branches’ failure to provide a social safety net in the face of rising
inequality. The legal profession and judiciary must step back to question whether the courts should be the
branch of government responsible for addressing socioeconomic needs on a case-by-case basis.
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tate civil courts are at the core of the modern American justice system and they are overwhelmed. These courts handle 98 percent of the
tens of millions of civil legal cases filed each year,
including those concerning people’s homes, family relationships, and finances.1 About 75 percent
of these cases involve at least one party without a
lawyer, and there is little possibility this reality will
change anytime soon.2 As a result, millions of people each year struggle to navigate state civil courts
to solve their problems.
In the face of this crisis, there are many calls for
change. One is for more and different assistance
for litigants. These reforms include creating a civil right to counsel, or allowing paralegals or others to represent individuals in legal matters just
as lawyers do now. They include improving information through explanatory documents or other
materials to explain court processes. Another approach to reform seeks to simplify courts themselves: reducing the complexity of legal processes
and systems so that ordinary people can navigate
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them without lawyer assistance. Called
court simplification, this approach is a logical, compassionate response to this quandary: if people do not have access to the
help they need to navigate the court system as it is designed, why not redesign
the court system so that people can navigate it on their own? If unrepresented
litigants could successfully navigate the
procedures, forms, and interactions with
clerks and judges in state courts, it would
be an improvement on the status quo.
The more modern-sounding versions of
these ideas–like “legal design” or “legal
tech”–have visceral appeal. Courts, state
bars, and other institutions are investing
in this approach.3
The need is real: the volume of cases
in state civil courts overwhelms their resources. The number of civil cases brought
to state courts hovers around twenty million per year.4 This number would be even
greater if all civil problems were brought
to court, but millions of Americans do not
even attempt to resolve their problems
through the court system.5 In some court
systems, 80 to 90 percent of litigants appear without lawyers.6 The system is an
adversarial one, designed for represented parties. But there is no right to an attorney in civil cases. There are not, nor
are there likely to be in the future, the resources to provide a lawyer in every civil matter before the courts. An enormous
number of Americans appear in state civil
courts without any assistance to navigate
the litigation process, and courts have no
choice but to serve these litigants despite
the mismatch between design and reality.

S

tate civil courts were not always so
overwhelmed. In the 1970s, and even in
the 1980s and 1990s, reported rates of
pro se litigants were much lower, from
the single digits to around 20 percent.7
Around the turn of the century, scholars
and judges started to call attention to the
148 (1) Winter 2019

“dramatic increase” of pro se litigation.8
There are some common explanations
for this change.
The first is the growth of poverty and
inequality in the United States. There are
over forty million Americans in poverty, almost double the number in the mid1970s and a significant increase from the
approximately thirty million people in
poverty in 2000.9 Some types of civil cases
can be logically tied to growing inequality,
such as dealing with family matters, housing, and consumer debt.10 These types of
cases directly reflect the problems an individual encounters when she struggles
economically: she misses rent payments
and her landlord attempts to evict her, her
marriage or custody arrangements are unstable, and her unpaid bills are subject to
collection. In each of these circumstances, a state civil court case is the ultimate
result. In addition, litigants appearing
without lawyers often explain that they
do so because they cannot afford attorneys, so these same cases are likely to be
ones in which the litigants are navigating
the court system on their own.11
A second explanation is that the problem is not only an increase in the number
of poor people and accompanying state
civil court cases but also, because other branches of government have failed to
respond to growing inequality, changes
in the kinds of cases that state courts see.
The executive and legislative branches
have aggressively pared back social safety
net programs, and the judicial branch is
required to hear the cases that result. For
example, since the welfare reform efforts
of 1996, fewer welfare benefits are available for poor families with children. For
poor families, child support now replaces rather than supplements welfare benefits.12 The number of custodial parents
with a support order has risen 44 percent
since 1999.13 As a result, state courts–as
the ones that handle child support issues
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–see far more support cases than they
did two decades ago. As another example, federal funds for public housing are
as low as they were four decades ago.14
Only one in four of the nineteen million
families that qualify for housing assistance receive it.15 Median rent has doubled over the past twenty years.16 Increasing inequality, higher rent, and less public-housing assistance mean that millions
of Americans face eviction each year, a
process handled by state civil courts. Further, eviction triggers a cascade of other
problems that lead people back to state
civil court, such as additional housing
disputes, consumer debt, divorce and
child custody, and child welfare cases.
Courts cannot decline cases presented to them, so the absence of action by
the legislative and executive branches
leaves courts managing litigants’ socioeconomic needs, which courts are neither designed nor equipped to address.
A state family court judge in any county
in America is likely to hear a case today in
which a wife (who has no lawyer) seeks
a divorce from her husband (who has no
lawyer), custody of their child (who has
no lawyer), and a protective order asking the husband to stay away from her because of threats and violence. Under state
law, this is a dispute about domestic violence, divorce, and custody, appropriately resolved in a state civil court.
If you sat in the preliminary hearing
for this case, you would recognize many
other problems wrought by inequality
and the absence of safety net programs.
You would hear allegations that the husband struggles with substance abuse. You
might infer that the wife suffers from untreated mental illness. You would hear
that the wife cannot access affordable
child care and cannot find a job with
hours to accommodate this challenge.
You would hear that both parties have
housing instability, rotating staying with

family and friends. You would hear that
the family’s consumer debt is growing.
You would hear that neither the husband
nor the wife completed education beyond high school.
The case is a matter of civil law, yet it
presents a range of socioeconomic needs
intertwined with inequality and its consequences–problems that are not being
addressed by the services and resources of other branches of government. The
husband does not have access to affordable substance abuse treatment, affordable housing, or adequate educational opportunities. The wife does not have access
to mental health care, affordable child
care or flexible employment hours, affordable housing, or adequate educational opportunities. Judges and courts faced
with cases like these attempt to meet the
challenge out of a combination of compassion, pragmatism, and legal obligation. State civil courts have been forced
to expand their roles significantly.

B

ut are state civil courts the appropriate
institution to address individual socioeconomic needs like untreated substance
abuse and mental illness, domestic violence, and unstable housing that manifest
in a society with stagnant wages and rising inequality? Court simplification and
related access-to-justice reforms rest on
the premise that more accessible courts
would allow litigants to achieve justice or
otherwise solve the problems they grapple with in state civil courts. This might
be true if state civil courts were not being asked to play their new, expansive
role. But they are, and it is worth exploring why courts might not be the appropriate institution to play this role, and
why court simplification will not necessarily lead to more substantive justice for
low-income litigants.
First, the core purpose of civil courts is
to resolve disputes between parties and,
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as the legal scholar Frederick Schauer
wrote, to “get the facts right.”17 In state
civil courts, the judges are the key actors in a context in which the “fact finder is at the mercy of the parties.”18 But the
reality of state civil court litigation is often entirely different from this ideal. The
adversarial process breaks down when
parties lack skilled legal counsel, as occurs in most state cases, especially when
an unrepresented, poor individual faces a represented party such as a landlord
or a bank. Even if the less powerful party receives more information or a simpler
process, the more powerful party is still
advantaged by representation and the expertise, relationships, and resources that
come with it. Further, the less powerful
party will continue to have the burden
of the related social problems entangled
with the legal dispute, which exacerbate
the power imbalance.
For example, a tenant in an eviction
matter will surely benefit from information that explains that lack of proper notice is a defense against eviction and also
explains the use of a standardized court
form that elicits related facts from the
tenant. At the same time, a landlord’s
lawyer with expertise in this area of law
who is a repeat player in this courthouse,
with all the benefits that flow from that
and with economic resources to devote to the eviction proceeding, will still
have more power in the dispute than the
tenant. One indicator of this dysfunction
in the system is the default rates in state
courts, which show that large numbers of
cases are resolved through one party not
participating in the process. According to
the National Center for State Courts, the
results in 18 percent of landlord-tenant
cases, 24 percent of debt-collection cases, and 29 percent of small-claims cases
were default judgments.19 Court simplification might address some of this lack of
participation, yet it does not address the
148 (1) Winter 2019

inequality that underlies the asymmetric
power in state civil courts.
Second, many of the problems that civil courts handle are symptoms of inequality. The design of civil courts constrains
the substantive law and procedural tools
at their disposal to address these symptoms. By the time the tenant comes to a
state civil court, she has already lost her
job and failed to pay her rent, which the
law says she can be evicted for. Court
simplification might make the legal process of eviction easier to navigate for the
tenant, and perhaps allow her to identify a defense that delays her eviction or reduces the amount of money she owes her
landlord, but the underlying problem remains. Even in this improved scenario,
the court’s capacity is limited. It could
give the tenant thirty additional days before she loses her home because the landlord failed to provide sufficient notice, but
it cannot help her with the other challenges related to her eviction, such as finding affordable child care, health care, or
employment that leads to savings to protect against future eviction. Courts cannot create and fund social safety net programs, expand the availability of affordable housing, or fulfill other functions of
the legislative and executive branches.
The socioeconomic needs that flow from
inequality and push parties into civil
courts cannot be simplified away within
the judicial branch.
To the extent that courts have historically and could in the future play a meaningful role in addressing larger questions
of inequality, that role has taken the form
of adjudicating issues of rights writ large,
and not addressing individual socioeconomic needs in the absence of a social
safety net. A focus on rights and systemic reform necessarily involves lawyers as
core players who identify, build, and litigate these resource-intensive and complex
cases. Court simplification–especially the
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version that contemplates a parallel set
of rules and procedures for unrepresented parties–undermines lawyers’ ability
to identify individual disputes from which
these systemic cases emerge.20 This risks
losing the collective law development that
leads to systemic equality or equity for
these same litigants. In trying to improve
the litigants’ ability to navigate the overwhelmed state civil courts, court simplification may risk making inequality worse.
Finally, pursuing court simplification
without challenging the idea that state
civil courts should address socioeconomic needs case by case runs the risk of contributing to dissatisfaction with the judicial system. If the structural problems underlying the civil access-to-justice crisis
persist, unrepresented litigants will continue to struggle in both the courts and society. Americans, regardless of party affiliation, are already skeptical of courts’ enforcement of public policy.21 Public dissatisfaction increases the challenges for
state courts: low public opinion of courts
will not help convince legislatures that
courts are underresourced. Low public
opinion of courts, in its most extreme
form, also risks undermining the balance
of power in our democratic government
by lowering the credibility of courts as a
coequal branch of government.

What if courts rose to the challenge

presented by the failure of other branches of government by developing the expertise, systems, and resources to address
litigants’ socioeconomic needs so that
their civil legal needs could be successfully met? In the criminal court system, alternative or problem-solving courts have
tried something similar to this approach.
Problem-solving courts are specialized
courts focusing on a subset (often a very
small number) of criminal defendants
with shared needs for social services, on
the belief that addressing these needs will

132

increase compliance with the law. The
court functions as a clearinghouse and
catalyst for individuals to obtain services
and address those needs. The goal of a
problem-solving court shifts from punishment and incarceration to treatment
of a social problem, like drug addiction
or mental illness. Problem-solving courts
have been heralded as great successes and
proposed as a model for civil courts.22
The success of problem-solving courts
reveals why state civil courts are ill-suited,
even in an idealized version, to address
litigants’ socioeconomic needs. Criminal
problem-solving courts have been successful because they can offer defendants
the chance to choose social services over
incarceration. While criminal and civil
litigants share unmet needs for social
services, the punishment framework of
criminal courts shapes both the courts’
role and the definition of success. Success
is staying in drug treatment and thus not
returning to jail (for noncompliance with
treatment or the commission of a new
crime). This message of success would
hardly satisfy a civil problem-solving
court. As New York’s former Chief Judge
Judith Kaye, a pioneer of problem-solving courts, put it,
the innovations discussed here–enhanced
treatment, special staffing, and judicial
monitoring–can accomplish only so much
in an individual’s life. They are not going to
make up for problems like chronic poverty,
substandard education, shoddy housing,
and inferior health care.23

Problem-solving courts create miniature or partial versions of executive branch
functions in the court systems. For example, criminal problem-solving courts shift
the location of care for the core service
(such as drug treatment) from a social service agency in the executive branch to the
judicial branch. An unfair aspect of this
shift, with systemic consequences in the
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age of mass incarceration, is that it criminalizes care: if a court participant does
not use the care, the individual is subject
to a criminal penalty to which they would
not be subject if they had not participated
in the problem-solving court.24 Problemsolving courts have been praised for saving state and local governments money
by doing work that other branches of government used to do less successfully.25
If the benefit of problem-solving courts
is that they are functionally relieving the
other branches of government of responsibility for meeting social service needs,
this new role is less a long-term solution than a short-term mitigation, which
masks yet does not solve the problems of
an insufficient social safety net in the face
of growing inequality.

Problem-solving courts were motivated

by the belief that judges have an obligation to solve the problems people bring to
court. Judges–and the legal profession–
do have an obligation to litigants who are
forced to present state civil courts with
their socioeconomic needs in the absence
of other alternatives. But the judiciary
and the legal profession should fulfill this
obligation outside the courthouse. Rather than accepting the theoretical, institutional, and political shifts that have cast
state civil courts as the agencies responsible for addressing individuals’ socioeconomic needs, courts–and the legal profession as a whole–must actively question whether they should be playing this
role. The profession must resist the temptation to address the consequences of this
change without also insisting that the
other branches of government provide a
social safety net to deal with the consequences for individuals of poverty and
inequality.
About a decade ago, state courts used
theories of inherent judicial power to
stand up to state legislatures over issues
148 (1) Winter 2019

of court funding. These same theories
could prove useful in calling attention to
the inappropriateness of the expansion
of the role of state civil courts. If a state
court system insisted on adequate funding to provide the services that state
courts are implicitly being asked to provide, it could expose the flaws in this
model and reveal that courts should not
be playing this role.
The most disadvantaged individuals in
society are also those most hurt by state
courts that are pressed into service as
the government branch of last resort. It
might seem inappropriate and politically untenable for the legal profession to focus on better mental health care or housing support for low-income Americans,
but there is a broader structural problem
that threatens the profession’s self-interest. If the civil court system continues to
be asked to play this role, it will continue to struggle to function at all. By resetting the balance of obligations among the
branches of government, courts would
have the opportunity to function as they
are intended to.
Changing the narrative of the role of
courts in this era of crisis will require revealing facts that are hard to come by.
Much is hidden about the work of state
civil courts. Court systems and scholars
have begun to partner to research state
court systems, and that research should
include examination of the role that
state civil courts are playing in addressing socioeconomic needs. Understanding that role will help illuminate the path
forward.26
Any change must begin with courts
and lawyers refusing to blindly accept the
courts as a last resort against the legislative and executive branches’ failures to
address inequality. As a profession, lawyers need to accept that court simplification, self-help, unbundled legal services, design thinking, and similar ideas
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address only short-term symptoms and
perpetuate the underlying problems. It is
in the profession’s self-interest and consistent with lawyers’ role as stewards of

law and justice to resist the theoretical
shift, and to advocate for courts doing
less of what they are not well-suited to do
and more of what they are.
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